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NON-MEDICAL SEX SELECTION BY
PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS:
REFLECTIONS ON ISRAELI LAW AND PRACTICE
Ruth Zafran'
While technology enabling sex selection by Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis ("PGD") is not new, the debate surrounding it
has not abated A wide variety of models exist. Some countries
leave the decision to the parents, while others strictly prohibit sex
selection for non-medical purposes. The Israeli system uses a
unique model whereby a professional committee is authorized to
approve non-medical PGD sex selection when the birth of a child
of a certain sex is shown to cause severe mental distress to the
parents or to the child, and the parents already have at least four
children of the same sex. This Article critically examines the
Israeli approach and how the model has been implemented since
2005. Beyond the Israeli system, this Article engages in non-
jurisdiction-specific theoretical and normative analysis. It
suggests that the potential harm embedded in non-medical sex
selection and its profound consequences on family relationships
are fundamental and they must be taken into account when policy
on the matter is set.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sex selection by means of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
("PGD") for non-medical reasons raises a host of weighty ethical,
legal, and social questions. The relatively widespread availability
of the technology that allows the selection of the sex of the embryo
' Visiting Scholar, The Center for the Study of Law and Society, UC
Berkeley. Assistant Professor of Law, Radzyner School of Law, IDC Herzliya,
Israel. I would like to thank Amnon Reichman, Joel Linsider, Tamar Fisher, and
Hanit Lugassy for their assistance. I would also like to thank the Center for the
Study of Law and Society in UC Berkeley and the IDC of Herzliya for their
generous support. This Article develops ideas published previously in Hebrew.
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prior to implementation in the womb requires the resolution of a
basic question: whether, and under what conditions, prospective
parents should be allowed to use this technology to select the sex
of their child. The answer to this question has been much debated
by commentators.2 In principle, the positions vary from little or no
legal interference with parental choice' all the way to a strict
prohibition on genetic selection. In that context, the Israeli
response to the challenge is unique and merits consideration.
Israeli health authorities addressed the issue of non-medical sex
selection by means of PGD in 2005 with the issuance of The
Procedure for Selecting the Embryo's Sex Through
2 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling
The Predetermination of a Child's Gender, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1992);
Rachel E. Remaley, "The Original Sexist Sin": Regulating Preconception Sex
Selection Technology, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 249 (2000); Frangoise Shenfield et
al., Taskforce 5: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 18 HUM. REPROD. 649,
651 (2003); Jodi Danis, Recent Development, Sexism and "The Superfluous
Female": Arguments for Regulating Pre-implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (1995); Rebecca Knox, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis:
Disease Control or Child Objectification?, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 435
(2003).
This position predominates in the United States. See Margaret Foster Riley
& Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Reproductive Genetics: A Review of
American Bioethics Commissions and Comparison to the British Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4-6
(2005).
4 This position predominates in the U.K., Germany, and Italy. See Ulrike
Meister et al., Knowledge and Attitudes Towards Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis in Germany, 20 HuM. REPROD. 231, 231-38 (2005); Erin L. Nelson,
Comparative Perspectives on the Regulation of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies in the United Kingdom and Canada, 43 ALBERTA L. REv. 1023,
1023-25 (2006); Riley & Merrill, supra note 3, at 38-40, 58; John A. Robertson,
Protecting Embryos and Burdening Women: Assisted Reproduction in Italy, 19
HUM. REPROD. 1693, 1693-96 (2004); John A. Robertson, Reproductive
Technology in Germany and the United States: An Essay in Comparative Law
and Bioethics, 43 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 189, 205-06, 223-24 (2004)
[hereinafter Robertson, Reproductive Technology]; Aaron R. Fahrenkrog, Note,
A Comparison of International Regulation of Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis and a Regulatory Suggestion for the United States, 15 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 757, 763-67 (2006).
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Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis' ("the 2005 Circular" or "the
Circular"). The Circular, issued by the Director General of the
Ministry of Health to all fertility clinics in Israel,' sets up the
procedures and the substantive conditions for the use of PGD for
non-medical sex selection. Under the Circular, such selection is
generally prohibited, but certain "exceptional, unusual and rare"'
cases may justify allowing parents to select the sex of their
embryo. Approval may be granted pursuant to an application to a
review committee of professional experts, established by the
Ministry of Health. In a nutshell, the committee may approve an
application if it is convinced that the prospective parents harbor a
deep emotional need to bear a child of a specific sex after already
having given birth to at least four previous children, all of the
opposite sex. Approval may also be granted in certain other
circumstances, as described below.
In this Article, I discuss this regulatory arrangement, with
reference to the values it represents and the practical experience
that has been gained since its implementation in 2005. I begin
with arguments for and against allowing parents to select an
embryo's sex in the absence of medical need. These arguments are
presented below in Parts II and III, respectively. After offering my
5 MINIsTRY OF HEALTH, DIRECTOR GENERAL CIRCULAR: NOHAL LEBREIRAT
MIN HAYILOD BE-IVHUN GENETI TROM HASHRASHATI, HOZER MANKAL MISRAD
HABRIUT MISPAR 21/05 [THE PROCEDURE FOR SELECTING THE EMBRYO'S SEX
THROUGH PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS], Sept. 5, 2005 [hereinafter
2005 CIRCULAR], available at http://abush.health.gov.il/download/forms/a2692_
mk21_05.pdf.
6 The actual legal force of the 2005 Circular vis-A-vis non-public institutions
is unclear. In one sense, the Circular can be seen as a binding regulation, but it
also can be viewed as merely an administrative guideline that limits only the
discretion of government officials. Practically, however, since most of the
hospitals and clinics in Israel are public or receive public funds, and since the
practice of medicine is highly regulated in Israel through licensing, the
instructions issued by the Director General of the Ministry of Health in such
circulars are treated by the profession as binding. They may, of course, be
challenged as ultra vires, as violating due process, or as violating a basic human
right, but I will proceed on the accepted assumption that the Circular is valid
law. See generally HCJ 5413/07 Anonymous v. Health Minister [2007] 12-13
(unpublished) (opinion of Rubinstein, J.).
7 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5, § 2.
189
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
assessment of each position, I turn to the details of the Israeli
regulatory regime, describing it in Part IV and evaluating it in Part
V. I conclude with some comments regarding the relevance of the
Israeli experience-and the critique thereof-to other systems
facing similar dilemmas.
II. FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND PRIVACY AS THE BASIS FOR
ALLOWING NON-MEDICAL SEX SELECTION
The desire to choose an embryo's sex has been a human
concern for many generations, as shown by the wide range of
"domestic methods" thought to achieve the desired result. These
include the timing of the sexual act, unique diets, positions
assumed by the couple during sexual intercourse, and various other
creative ideas.' In contrast to these unproven techniques, there are
now at least two scientifically grounded methods for
accomplishing sex selection. The first relies on the identification
and separation of sperm cells (sperm sorting).9  The second
involves Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), a technique
used primarily for detecting genetic disorders in eggs fertilized in
vitro.'o In the course of PGD, it is possible to ascertain the sex
8 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE
OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 19 (2007); Jones, supra note 2, at 4-6.
9 On the general technical aspects of sperm sorting, see Jerome H. Check &
Diane Katsoff, A Prospective Study to Evaluate the Efficacy of Modified Swim-
Up Preparation for Male Sex Selection, 8 HUM. REPROD. 211 (1993); Ethics
Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Preconception Gender Selection for
Nonmedical Reasons, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 861 (2001); G. Alan Rose &
Anthony Wong, Experiences in Hong Kong with the Theory and Practice of the
Albumin Column Method of Sperm Separation for Sex Selection, 13 HUM.
REPROD. 146, 146-47 (1998); Joe L. Simpson & Sandra A. Carson, The
Reproductive Option of Sex Selection, 14 HuM. REPROD. 870 (1999); and
Francesca Vidal et al., Preliminary Study of the Incidence of Disomy in Sperm
Fractions After MicroSort Flow Cytometry, 14 HUM. REPROD. 2987, 2987-88
(1999).
'o PGD can be regarded most simply as a biopsy and genetic testing of one of
the cells of the fertilized egg, a procedure that can reveal the genetic profile of
the fertilized egg and, in principle, of the resulting child. For the general
technical aspects of the procedure, see Sozos J. Fasouliotis & Joseph G.
Schenker, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Principles and Ethics, 13 HuM.
REPROD. 2238 (1998); and Willy Lissens & Karen Sermon, Preimplantation
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chromosomes of the fertilized egg prior to its implantation in the
gestational mother's body." This latter method has proven to be
highly successful, and its recent regulation is the focus of this
Article.
The yearning for a child of a particular sex is, at its core, a
subjective matter. On the premise that our culture views such a
choice as bearing not only on the newborn's life but also on the
parents' sense of self-fulfillment, it has been argued that permitting
sex selection promotes the parents' liberty to shape their lives as
they see fit.'2 No matter how subjective, if they perceive their
newborn's sex to be critical in shaping the dimensions of their
family life, the parents should have, in principle, the choice to
make such a meaningful decision with autonomy.
The desire for a child of a particular sex may stem from
personal preference or be rooted in a socio-cultural context. Some
parents may express this preference by an explicit wish or desire to
beget a child of a particular sex." Others, having already parented
children of one sex, may want a child of the opposite sex for
Genetic Diagnosis: Current Status and New Developments, 12 HuM. REPROD.
1756 (1997).
" John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The
Ethical Debate, 18 HuM. REPROD. 465, 468-70 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson,
Ethical Debate]; see also John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis: Medical and Non-Medical Uses, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 213,
213-14 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson, Extending PGD].
12 See Jason C. Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 37-39, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
dltr/articles/2002dltr0012.html; Robertson, Extending PGD, supra note 11, at
470; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 439, 462 (2003).
13 For a variety of research that examines what motivates parents to choose
their children's sex and the attitudes of parents and doctors towards sex selection
by PGD, see LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW
WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 142-43 (1999); Edgar Dahl et al.,
Preconception Sex Selection for Non-Medical Reasons: A Representative
Survey from Germany, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2231 (2003); Edgar Dahl et al.,
Preconception Sex Selection for Non-Medical Reasons: A Representative
Survey from the U.K., 18 HUM. REPROD. 2238 (2003); and Robertson, Extending
PGD, supra note 11, at 468-70.
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purposes of family balance or, at least, for allowing representation
of both sexes within the family 4 and the different experiences that
might come with rearing both boys and girls." Socio-cultural
motivations are particularly prominent in Asia,16 where the
preference for male children results from the inferior status of
women, economic considerations (including inheritance and dowry
rules), and the desire to perpetuate the family name. 7
Alongside the argument of parental choice, there is the
prevailing view that individual decisions in the area of
reproduction and fertility merit the protection of the right to
privacy." As the United States Supreme Court has plainly said,
"[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.""
Similarly, in the United States a woman's right to control her body
14 Shenfield et al., supra note 2; see also Guido Pennings, Ethics of Sex
Selection for Family Balancing: Family Balancing as a Morally Acceptable
Application of Sex Selection, 11 HuM. REPROD. 2339 (1996); Julian Savulescu
& Edgar Dahl, Sex Selection and Preimplantation Diagnosis: A Response to the
Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 15 HuM.
REPROD. 1879, 1880 (2000).
Is Pennings, supra note 14; see also Robertson, Ethical Debate, supra note 11.
16 See, e.g., Peter Liu & G. Alan Rose, Ethics of Sex Selection for Family
Balancing: Sex Selection: The Right Way Forward, 11 HUM. REPROD. 2343,
2343-44 (1996); A. Malpani et al., Preimplantation Sex Selection for Family
Balancing in India, 17 HuM. REPROD. 11 (2002); Dorothy C. Wertz,
International Perspectives on Ethics and Human Genetics, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1411, 1432-33 (1993); Kenan Farrell, Note, Where Have All the Young
Girls Gone? Preconception Gender Selection in India and the United States, 13
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 259-63 (2002).
17 In India and China, for example, sex preference frequently results in the
termination of a pregnancy when the embryo is identified by ultrasound
diagnosis as female. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. Notably,
the preference for males is bound up with an economic preference. Whereas
males are expected to work and contribute to the family's sustenance, females
will become an economic burden due to the expectation of a dowry payment
when they get married.
18 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453-55 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
19 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
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has been conceptualized as stemming from the right to be let
alone.2 o Consequently, parents who claim that they should be
allowed to plan their family free from state intervention argue in
favor of allowing sex selection. In the case of a woman's right to
privacy, the claim is even stronger because the embryo's sex may
well have a direct bearing on the number of pregnancies and births
that a woman might have to undergo before realizing her desire
(and that of her spouse) for a child of a particular sex. Put
differently, to the extent that privacy creates a sphere in which
intimate decisions can be made without interference from the state,
the decision whether to have a boy or a girl surely belongs within
such a sphere.2'
III. PROTECTING WOMEN AND CHILDREN
AND SECURING FAMILIES AS THE BASIS FOR
RESTRICTING NON-MEDICAL SEX SELECTION
In principle, access to the means of improving one's quality of
life or for expanding the scope of one's choice should be denied by
society only where such a denial is shown to be justified. That is
certainly the case when that which is being infringed upon is a
recognized liberty such as procreation or the right to privacy. With
respect to preimplantation sex selection, the legal literature indeed
puts forward a plethora of justifications for denying such means.22
One of the more frequently raised claims alleges a potential
disruption of the demographic balance between the sexes.23 It is
claimed that freedom to choose the embryo's sex will allow
implementation of a preference for male offspring, culminating in
20 See L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 434-35 n.18 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
21 On the constitutional aspect of whether the desire to choose an embryo's
sex should be seen as invoking substantive due process protection associated
with fundamental reproductive rights, see Remaley, supra note 2, at 255-59.
22 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 17, 20-25 (1998);
Remaley, supra note 2, at 266-81; Roberts, supra note 12, at 23-24 & n.32.
23 Remaley, supra note 2, at 277-78; Ashley Bumgarner, Note, A Right to
Choose?: Sex Selection in the International Context, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
Pot'Y 1289, 1294-98 (2007).
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an overall distortion of the ratio of males to females in the
population and an insufficient number of women. Proponents of
this view point to the accumulated experience of countries such as
Azerbaijan,2 4 India,25 and China,26 where the demographic balance
has indeed been disrupted as a result of the abortion of female
embryos identified in ultrasound examinations.27
This argument, however, is rooted in the particular experience
of Asia, and its relevance for the West is doubtful. Research
conducted in Western societies fails to bear out the initial concern
that enabling sex selection inevitably leads to an overall
preponderance of male births. Although there is some indication
of a preference that a first child be male,28 this trend changes with
respect to subsequent children, where the dominant motivation
seems to be a desire for family balancing.29 Furthermore, despite
the widespread a priori preference for a particular sex, most people
are apparently reluctant to take steps to realize that preference, at
least by means of existing techniques.30
The fear of disrupting the demographic balance would seem to
be similarly inapplicable in the Israeli context. A pilot study
conducted in Israel a few years ago by the Gertner Institute for
Health Policy and Epidemiology (coordinated with the Ministry of
Health) found that the majority of those surveyed were opposed to
24 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 61 (2003), available at http://www.bioethics.
gov/reports/beyondtherapy/beyondtherapyfinalwebcorrected.pdf.
25 Mehroo D. Hansotia, Family Balancing by Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis in India, 17 HUM. REPROD. 2778, 2778-79 (2002); Farrell, supra note
16, at 256-59.
2 6 See, e.g., Baochang Gu & Krishna Roy, Sex Ratio at Birth in China, with
Reference to Other Areas in East Asia: What We Know, 10 ASIA-PAC. POPULATION
J. 17 (1995), available at http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/joumal/
Articles/1995/V10N3A2.htm; Zeng Yi et al., Causes and Implications of the
Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China, 19 POPULATION &
DEv. REV. 283 (1993).
27 See supra notes 23-26; see also Dahl et al., supra note 13.
28 See Dahl et al., supra note 13; see also Robertson, Extending PGD, supra
note 11, at 214 ("[I]t could lead to great disparities in the sex ratio of the
population, as has occurred in China and India.").
29 See sources cited supra note 13.
30 See Dahl et al., supra note 13, at 2233.
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allowing sex selection." Even among those who had an a priori
desire for bearing males, the overwhelming majority were
unwilling to choose the embryo's sex themselves.32 The reluctance
to embrace non-medical sex selection is corroborated by the
relatively low number of applications based on the recent
regulation in Israel." It should be noted, however, that despite the
low number of applicants, a clear majority applied for a permit to
conceive a male child.34
As a practical matter, the data collected from Germany, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Israel suggests that, at
least in these Western societies, the concern about disrupting the
demographic balance loses its urgency, either because it is unclear
that males are preferred over females or because only a marginal
percentage of the population has expressed willingness to deploy
technology in order to select the sex of the embryo.
An interrelated argument against allowing the selection of an
embryo's sex is raised in the name of feminism. It maintains that
allowing for sex selection would be harmful to women when the
expected outcome, as aforesaid, might favor male fetuses.3 ' The
argument is that granting social legitimacy to choosing male
embryos would compound discrimination against women. In my
3' Yael Hashiloni-Dolev, The Gertner Inst. for Health Policy &
Epidemiology-Sheba Med. Ctr., Presentation at a Conference Organized by the
International Center for Health, Law, and Ethics: What Kind of Selection?:
Medical, Legal, Ethical, and Social Aspects of Sex Selection (Feb. 7, 2006). In
addition, the findings of a 2007 study conducted in Israel showed that parents
had a certain preference for bearing girls. Market Watch-Market Research
Public Opinion Polls, Poll Conducted in Advance of the Publication of the
Guidebook SODOT HA-HOROTE [THE SECRETS OF PARENTHOOD] (2007)
(unpublished study, details on file with author). Nevertheless, it should be noted
that the study was limited to the Israeli Jewish population.
32 Hashiloni-Dolev, supra note 31.
3 In more than two years (from its inception until September 2007) less than
200 applications were submitted for review by the professional committee in
charge of the implementation of the Circular. Interview with Tova Bareket,
Sec'y, Labor, Welfare & Health Prof I Comm. (Jan. 8, 2008); see infra notes
92-93 and accompanying text.
34 Interview with Tova Bareket, supra note 33. More than 75% of the
applications sought a permit to choose a male embryo. Id.
35 Remaley, supra note 2, at 274.
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view, however, the conceptual force of this argument applies only
when there exists a clear preference within a given system for the
selection of male embryos. Against the background I presented
above, which suggests that allowing for choice would have no
significant effect on the relative numbers of boys and girls that are
born, this argument loses its practical force.
Some arguments for precluding sex selection are grounded in
moral or religious principles. There are two types, and their
persuasiveness will depend on the reader's faith and worldview.
First, there are arguments that reason from the metaphysical
meaning of the birth process which view selection of an embryo's
sex as an artificial, illegitimate intervention in Nature's, or God's,
act of creation. 6 Arguments of this sort lead to reservations about
sex selection in and of itself, without regard to how it is
performed." And while the metaphysical issue of intervention in
the act of the creation of life entails a certain religious perspective,
it is not devoid of more general ethical components related to the
proper bounds of medical interventions. According to this
position, there is good reason to curb medical interventions that do
not promote individual or public health." This perspective would
limit the physician's role to treatments required by actual medical
needs.
The second line of arguments looks to the procedure employed
in selecting the embryo's sex and the consequences associated with
it. These arguments may vary with the specific procedure that is
used-sperm sorting or PGD"-and with the use made of the
sperm cells or ova left after the procedure has been completed.4 0
When PGD is involved, the opposition focuses its arguments on
36 Elliot N. Dorff, Jewish Theological and Moral Reflections on Genetic
Screening: The Case of BRCAl, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 71-72 (1997); Jones,
supra note 2, at 22; Danis, supra note 2, at 234, 240-41; Eric Lode, Comment,
Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1469, 1538
(1999).
3 David Heyd, Male or Female, We Will Create Them: The Ethics of Sex
Selection for Non-Medical Reasons, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 204, 205 (2003).
3 Id. at 208.
39 On the various means available for selection and the differences among
them, see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
40 Heyd, supra note 37, at 206-07.
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the harm done to fertilized eggs (called "embryos" by those
seeking to accord them greater protection).4 The selection process
sometimes entails the destruction of "leftover" fertilized eggs that
do not meet the selection criteria and therefore are not returned to
the mother's body. Of the fertilized eggs of the "wrong" sex that
are left over, some are actively destroyed, while others are
dedicated to research or simply kept frozen and unused. Unless
this "surplus" of pre-embryos is donated to others for use in
assisted reproduction, strong objections to sex selection can be
anticipated from those who view fertilized eggs as the beginning of
life and therefore regard them as no less sacred than human life in
any other form.42
Various religions have different views on the point at which
life begins and the degree of sanctity to be attributed to the
materials that mark that point. The Roman Catholic Church would
be opposed to any process that determines sex by means of in vitro
fertilization ("IVF"). Believing, as it does, that the fertilized egg is
a pre-embryo entitled to have its life protected, the Catholic
Church would object in all respects to any sex selection process
that entails the preimplantation determination of the fertilized
egg's sex; the foreseeable result of any such process is the
destruction of eggs that are not of the desired gender.43 Even
41 Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting
Gender, Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & Jus. 241, 252 (2005); David
M. Smolin, Does Bioethics Provide Answers?: Secular and Religious Bioethics
and Our Procreative Future, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 473, 508-13 (2004-2005);
Sherylynn Fiandaca, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryos: The Need
for International Guidelines, 8 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH. 337, 358-65 (1998).
42 See generally Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo:
Implications for Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U.L. REV. 303, 318-20 (2006) ("Roman
Catholic church teachings also condemned IVF for separating procreation from
marital unity, for threatening the stability of marriage and family life, and
causing the discard and destruction of embryos." (citations omitted)); Elizabeth
Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in
Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 261, 272-73 (1998) ("The
mainstream position of the Catholic Church has now become instant animation,
the human soul infusing at the moment of conception." (citation omitted)).
43 See Daar, supra note 41, at 252; S. Matthew Liao, The Ethics of Using
Genetic Engineering for Sex Selection, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 116 (2005);
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Judaism, which is somewhat less protective of sperm and egg cells,
opposes a process that leads to the destruction of fertilized eggs for
the sole purpose of socially motivated sex selection.4 4
Another argument widespread in the literature cites the
"slippery slope" as a reason for limiting the permitted uses of
science and technology.$ Advocates of this position maintain that
allowing for the selection of an embryo's sex would only be the
first step toward permitting other, less legitimate measures. If sex
selection is a legitimate reason for selection among embryos, why
not a whole range of other grounds, including future physical
appearance, expected intellect, sexual orientation, temperament,
musical talent, or mathematical aptitude?
The objection to allowing selection for these other choices
seems to be grounded in their eugenic implications. Socially
motivated sex selection, to be sure, does not give rise to such
concerns about efforts to "improve" the race, but such concerns are
sure to arise in the future, when perfected diagnostic tools and
increased knowledge of genetics may enable parents to strive to
ensure the birth of "improved" or at least "the best possible"
offspring. Even if the choices mentioned above lack the capacity
to serve as positive intervention in the human genome-involving,
as they do, only a choice among embryos produced through a
fertilization process and entailing no use of genetic manipulation to
shape the fetus's genetic profile-they can still lead indirectly to
other methods directed at improving the race, for only the "best"
Robertson, Ethical Debate, supra note 11; Smolin, supra note 41, at 508-13;
Fiandaca, supra note 41, at 358-65.
" On the stance taken by halakhah (Jewish law) with regard to gametes and
fertilized eggs, see Yehoshua Ben-Meir, Legal Parenthood and Genetic
Parenthood in Jewish Law, 12 JEWISH L. ANN. 153, 165 (1993); and Miryam Z.
Wahrman, Fruit of the Womb: Artificial Reproductive Technologies & Jewish
Law, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 109, 114-15 (2005).
45 For the "slippery slope" argument in general and as it relates to this Article,
see Heyd, supra note 37; Savulescu & Dahl, supra note 14; Wibren van der
Burg, The Slippery Slope Argument, 102 ETHICS 42 (1991); Danis, supra note 2,
at 241-42; Susan M. Faust, Comment, Baby Girl or Baby Boy? Now You Can
Choose: A Look at New Biology and No Law, 10 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 281,
292-94 (2000); and Lode, supra note 36, at 1537-38.
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fetuses will have the privilege of being allowed to come into the
world.
Despite its initial allure, I find the slippery-slope argument
unpersuasive.46 Fear that a technological innovation will be put to
some harmful use-however severe the outcome for the individual
or however adverse its consequences for society-does not by
itself warrant forbidding the innovation outright. Even if there is
reason to rank the various uses on a continuum of harm or potential
harm, I see no persuasive reason to forbid a benign practice simply
because it may exist on a continuum with practices that ought to be
banned. Banning the harmful practices themselves provides all the
needed protection. It follows that preimplantation sex selection
should be barred only if it is itself improper.
Yet another argument against allowing preimplantation sex
selection focuses on the issue of funding and is grounded in the
principle of equality and the desire to ensure social justice. To the
extent that preimplantation sex selection is permitted, the question
of funding necessarily arises. In jurisdictions that publicly fund
fertility treatments (and that recognize the right to be a parent as a
fundamental right) it can be argued that sex selection should be
publicly funded too. However, the national healthcare budget, by
its very nature, is limited, and the inclusion of funding for
preimplantation sex selection will clearly diminish the resources
available for other, seemingly more important, health services.47
While the allocation of scarce resources is always a complex
matter, we can assume a broad consensus that socially motivated
sex selection should not be budgeted for at the expense of such
health services as immunization, medicines, and a range of medical
treatments; to do so would be to contravene fundamental concepts
of social justice.48 I would venture to guess that a majority of the
46 Heyd, supra note 37; Savulescu & Dahl, supra note 14, at 1879.
47 Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1449
(1994).
48 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New
Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
403, 460-71 (2006) (arguing that "health resource allocation models are
unworkable unless they consider the necessity and appropriateness of medical
care").
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public will likely assign a higher priority to the prevention of
illness and the provision of effective medical treatment than to
enabling parents to ensure that their child will be of a particular
sex.
But is it essential that preimplantation sex selection be funded
from the public purse? Those who support allowing it can argue
that permitting the procedure does not dictate public funding and
that the costs should be borne by those using it.49 At this point,
however, an argument based on the principle of equality might be
raised: the cost of PGD is not trivial, and without public funding
the procedure would be unavailable to people who are unable to
pay for it.5o Arguably, the principle of equality calls for forbidding
the procedure outright; if it cannot be afforded by all, it should be
allowed to none. But this argument, too, is unpersuasive.
Even if socially motivated preimplantation sex selection is
permitted in general, it need not be open, as a practical matter, to
all. Failing to provide access to one group-namely, those unable
to pay-would not differentiate between groups in a way that
increases unjust discrimination. As in the case of cosmetic plastic
surgery, which is not publicly funded and therefore available only
to those with private resources, the sex selection procedure does
not implicate serious health-related issues, and therefore the moral
imperative to ensure equal access loses its force." This is to be
distinguished from selecting among embryos on the basis of
health-related indicia or even on the basis of personal qualities. In
such cases, use of the procedure might lead to furthering existing
gaps between different social groups, as the economically
advantaged could be transformed into the genetically advantaged
49 Savulescu & Dahl, supra note 14.
so In Israel, the procedure is estimated to cost about 20,000 NIS; in the United
States, the cost ranges between $10,000 and $17,500. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE
BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE
OF CONCEPTION 213 (2006).
5 Roxanne Mykitiuk & Steven Penney, Screening for "Deficits ": The Legal
and Ethical Implications of Genetic Screening and Testing To Reduce Health
Care Budgets, 3 HEALTH L.J. 235, 256-60 (1995); Michael H. Shapiro, Does
Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten Human Equality and
Democracy?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 769, 778 (2002).
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as well.5 2 It follows that as long as we are speaking only of sex
selection, a matter of little import to the shape of the community as
a whole, it is hard to argue persuasively against allowing it to be
conducted on a privately funded basis.
One of the more persuasive arguments against sex selection is
based on the health of the woman. As noted, PGD entails IVF, and
IVF is not free of medical risk. A woman undergoing IVF must
receive hormone therapy, the long-term effects of which are
unclear." She must then undergo an invasive procedure, under
anesthesia, for the harvesting of her ova. It is already known that
hormone therapy can entail immediate health risks, sometimes
(albeit very rarely) fatal ones.54 The success rate for the procedure
is not high, and several rounds of treatment often are needed before
a pregnancy finally results." Although the woman has the right to
decide for herself whether to assume the risks to her health (on the
premise that she receives all the information needed for informed
consent), those risks are still worthy of being taken into account in
devising the applicable legal regime.
The most persuasive argument against allowing
preimplantation sex selection pertains to the effects on children in
general, and on parent-child relationships in particular. The
concern raised by this argument is that allowing parents to
determine a child's genetic profile may impair inter-family
relations, not necessarily immediately or even directly, but
nonetheless in a fundamental way and with far-reaching
implications for generations to come.
52 For an argument against preimplantation and embryo selection based in part
on concern about a social-genetic hierarchy, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION
218 (2002).
5 See Helen Klip et al., Cancer Risk Associated with Subfertility and
Ovulation Induction: A Review, 11 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 319 (2000).
54 See J.G. Schenker & Y. Ezra, Complications of Assisted Reproductive
Techniques, 61 FERTILITY & STERILITY 411 (1994).
5 On the general health risks, see Reija Klemetti et al., Complications of IVF
and Ovulation Induction, 20 HUM. REPROD. 3293 (2005); and Helen Klip et al.,
Risk of Benign Gynaecological Diseases and Hormonal Disorders According to
Responsiveness to Ovarian Stimulation in IVF: A Follow-up Study of 8714
Women, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1951 (2003).
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Normatively, the unique foundation upon which parent-child
relations are premised is unqualified and unconditional
acceptance.5 6 Parents are expected to care for their child without
reservation, under any circumstance. A child whose birth is
undesired, who is sick or "defective," or who fails to meet
parentally set standards, is nonetheless entitled to devoted and
equal care and treatment from her parents. To be clear, I am not
arguing that parent-child relationships invariably have these
qualities under all circumstances. Sadly, the real world is more
complicated, and the expectation that parents will do well by their
children, accept them as they are, and treat them with
unconditional love is not always borne out. The argument here is
grounded on ideal parental relations; it is this ideal, I believe, that
the legal system must take as its guide and goal in devising
regulatory regimes. If a certain legal regulation acts to undermine
this ideal type, this, in my mind, is a good reason to amend the
legal regulation. In our context, the ideal scenario is well stated by
Michael Sandel:
To appreciate children as gifts is to accept them as they come, not as
objects of our design, or products of our will, or instruments of our
ambition. Parental love is not contingent on the talents and attributes
the child happens to have. We choose our friends and spouses at least
partly on the basis of qualities we find attractive. We do not choose our
children.5 7
Needless to say, the law is powerless to guarantee ideal family
relations. It can neither enforce affection and love nor guarantee
human warmth or care. But the law can make a modest
contribution by creating the conditions that promote such relations
and by structuring the background and atmosphere in which warm
family relationships are forged-or, at least, by ensuring that legal
provisions do not damage the fabric of these relations." Some
would also say that the law sends a constitutive message regarding
56 Rosalind McDougal, Acting Parentally: An Argument Against Sex
Selection, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 601, 603-04 (2005); Guido Pennings, The Right
To Choose Your Donor: A Step Towards Commercialization or a Step Towards
Empowering the Patient?, 15 HUM. REPROD. 508, 509-10 (2000).
5 SANDEL, supra note 8, at 45.
58 Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 30 (1986).
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the ideal type of such relationships.5 9 As Bartlett and Stack say in
a different context, the law has an "expressive or symbolic power
to alter social expectations and norms.""o
As in the case of other aspects of family law, here too, the law
plays a role in structuring the anticipated contours of parent-child
relations.' Authorizing the use of preimplantation sex selection
would almost inevitably foster the perception that a parent is
"entitled" to a selected child, one having a personally chosen
genetic trait, namely his or her sex. This concern exists even
though the selection in our case is made only with respect to
gender and only from among the limited variety of fertilized eggs
the parents can naturally provide. Even with these limitations, we
are still dealing with the selection of an embryo not merely to
maintain a basic state of good health,62 but rather on the basis of
external parameters or personal preferences of the parents. Doing
so entrenches a conceptual linkage between the right to parenthood
and the right to a particular type of parenthood. People are free to
choose whether or not to become a parent, but broadening that
choice to encompass whether or not to become a parent to a child
of a particular sex fundamentally transforms the nature of
parenthood.
The concern is that under such circumstances, parental feelings
of love, satisfaction, and personal reward would emerge as a result
of the parent's specifications being met, both in the child's genetic
profile (his or her sex) and in its expression in the reality of the
child's life. If, however, those parental expectations for some
reason were not met-for example, if a medical error occurs-the
5 For an example, see Beverly Horsburgh, Redefining the Family:
Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker and the Importance of Relational Needs,
25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 423, 503 (1992).
60 Bartlett & Stack, supra note 58, at 28.
61 Cf Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity
to a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 83, 141-43 (2004)
(advocating for a "rewriting of our [legal] definition of family").
62 Even selection on the basis of health-related criteria is somewhat
controversial. See Knox, supra note 2, at 140-44; Lindsey A. Vacco, Comment,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to
Customizing Children. Can the Technology Be Regulated Based on the Parents'
Intent?, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1181, 1186-89 (2005).
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parents might feel deceived and might even direct their feelings of
disappointment and frustration toward the child who had failed to
turn out as expected.
The effect, moreover, would likely flow both ways and also
alter the child's relation to her parents. A child chosen by virtue of
a specific genetic characteristic (in contrast to one whose genetic
fate was determined by the usual "natural selection") may well
decide to challenge her parents regarding the nature of their
choice-what they opted for and what they avoided. Sex selection,
like some other genetic determinations, is irreversible (or
reversible only at great personal cost) and inescapable (in the sense
that a person does not have the option to ignore it). A person
chosen for her sex might therefore be anxious about the yoke of
anticipation cast upon her by the choice her parents made. This
line of argument is often heard with respect to "designer babies"
(babies "manufactured" via parental interference with the embryo
genotype to produce specific characteristics),6 3 but it is true as well
for "selected babies," as in our case when the child could not have
been born at all unless she had been selected on the basis of the
genotype of the fertilized egg from which she developed.
The danger is clear: the more the parents' preferences for a
child's genetic makeup are met through active, external, and
calculated intervention, the greater their expectation will be for that
child to fulfill the "genetic promise," namely to lead a life
consistent with what the genes are supposedly intended to
achieve.' This may cover both physical characteristics and
personality traits. Such a design is detrimental to the child even if
she lives up to expectations, given the emotional stress involved,
and it is a fortiori detrimental if she fails to live up to them.
Moreover, allowing parents to choose the newborn's sex might
further entrench the already existing tendencies among parents,
offspring, and society to overemphasize the role genes play in
63 See Vacco, supra note 62, at 1193-96.
6 See Faust, supra note 45, at 292-94.
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individual self-development and in the formulation of relationships
with others."5
If a statute allowing genetic selection were to receive public
attention and visibility, it might serve to undermine the existing
social consensus regarding parenthood, according to which
parental care and responsibility do not depend on the child's
specific traits but are embedded in the relationship itself. As
Sandel argues, "parents bent on enhancing their children are more
likely to overreach, to express and entrench attitudes at odds with
the norm of unconditional love." 6
The change in attitude might take place even without
widespread use of preimplantation sex selection procedures; it is
enough that the procedures have high public visibility. It is fair to
assume that the availability of the procedure and its use in selected
instances would gain broad media attention-it is, after all, an
attractive subject for journalists-and would resonate within the
public consciousness. And that, in turn, would promote the
worrisome change in attitude, even if the procedure itself did not
become routine.
There is a related, rather narrower, argument pertaining to the
effect of preimplantation sex selection on the child herself or on
65 As Dreyfuss & Nelkin illustrate:
Society appropriates science to support prevailing values, sometimes
extending it beyond the limits of well-accepted knowledge. Thus, the
enthusiasm of some members of the scientific community draws public
attention to genetic relationships. Media articles on reproductive
technologies imply that women should reproduce at all costs for they
will be emotionally "desperate" without their own children. Those
unable to conceive seek out surrogate mothers in order to have
genetically related children. Films and articles on parent-child
relationships suggest the importance of genetic integrity, of "flesh and
blood."
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics,
45 VAND. L. REv. 313, 319 (1992) (citing John McCormick & Pat Wingert,
Whose Child Am I Anyway?, NEWSWEEK, Summer 1991, at 58). See generally
DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON (1995).
66 SANDEL, supra note 8, at 49. Sandel is speaking here of non-medical sex
selection as well.
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her social status (as distinct from its effect on parent-child relations
in general). At the very least, concern for the well-being of a
specific child warrants restricting the parents' freedom to
intervene, for such intervention may transform the child, to her
detriment, into a "commodity"-something evaluated exclusively
in terms of its genetic features, seen as a means instead of an end,
and considered to be an acquirable object rather than a person in
her own right.67 In that sense, selection of the child's sex is just
one of a variety of options available to parents when filling out
their child's genetic "specification."
Bearing these concerns in mind, I believe that it is preferable to
disallow the use of procedures for choosing the embryo's sex. I
recognize that the arguments regarding the child and her
relationship with her parents are premised on assumptions about
the consequences that I foresee. Although speculative in character,
the consequences that follow are not the kind that a society that
values its children can afford to disregard.
The same conclusion is suggested even where a mother is
already using IVF (and even PGD for medical reasons) to
conceive. In such cases, allowing for sex selection would not
increase the risk to the mother's health (since IVF is being used
anyway), but it would still pose the foregoing risks to the overall
well-being and welfare of the child. A general prohibition is
preferable because of the clear message it broadcasts and because
it avoids establishing two classes of parents: those permitted to
use preimplantation sex selection procedures (because they are
already undergoing PGD for medical reasons or already using IVF
to conceive), and those barred from using them.
There is a counterargument that might be raised against the
view that sex selection by means of PGD should be banned to
protect the interests of the child and the parent-child relationship.
67 Vicki G. Norton, Comment, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic
Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1581, 1608-09 (1994); see also Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and
Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and
Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 257,
271-72 (2002).
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One might maintain that sex is not so substantial a factor in
shaping the child's identity (at least in Western societies), and that
allowing parents to make so relatively insignificant a choice-
more a matter of "taste" than of substance-would not harm the
overall parent-child relationship or the status of children in general.
This argument is grounded in the premise that belonging to one sex
or the other has no significant effect on shaping the person, that it
is a neutral characteristic incapable of substantively influencing the
course of a person's life-except, perhaps, with respect to
biological matters.
This premise, however, does not describe real life, and even in
Western societies, selecting a child's sex is not a marginal or
insignificant choice. Even today, one's sex (or, using the more
accurate term in this context, one's gender) plays a significant part
in shaping an individual's life, exerting substantive, sometimes
even determinative, influence on its course. As a practical matter,
this is part of what motivates parents to want to choose their
child's sex. In this sense, preimplantation sex selection is not an
exceptional case, for one can think of other choices having
significant influence on the course of a person's life-for example,
choices related to sexual orientation, intellectual capacity, or
personal temperament (insofar as they are formed genetically).
Even minor choices related to external appearance-height or hair
color-can regrettably play a real part, even if only indirectly, in
forming a person's life.68 Even a choice where consequences for
the individual are minor (for example, the form taken by the
fingers or the structure of the eyebrow) should not be provided for,
given the conceptual harm to parent-child relationships that might
arise from it. By its nature, however, this line of thinking is
theoretical-as it seems unlikely that anyone would take on the
burden of undergoing PGD in order to ensure development of an
unimportant characteristic-so it could be left open for now.
Against this background, I turn to consider Israeli law and practice.
6 See, e.g., STEPHEN S. HALL, SIZE MATTERS: How HEIGHT AFFECTS THE
HEALTH, HAPPINESS, AND SUCCESS OF BOYS-AND THE MEN THEY BECOME
(2006) (detailing a study of how height affects a person's life on a variety of
aspects).
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IV. ISRAELI LAW AND PRACTICE: INTRODUCTION
The Israeli approach to sex selection underwent a change three
years ago, when the 2005 Circular 9 replaced the previous Circular
of September 2003.70 The earlier regulation had prohibited, in all
IVF procedures, the selection of the embryo's sex (except for
medical reasons), including by means of PGD.
Section 2 of the 2005 Circular maintains the general
prohibition of the selection of the embryo's sex for non-medical
purposes," but allows for permits to be issued for such a procedure
in "rare and exceptional" cases.72 According to the Circular,
several cumulative conditions must be met before such a permit is
granted. First, there must be a real and substantial danger that the
child's welfare, or the emotional health of at least one parent,
would be injured if the requested selection procedure is not
performed. Second, the applicants must already have at least four
joint children (that is, children born to the two applicants, not
stepchildren of either) of the same sex.74 Deviation from this
condition is possible, but only in particularly rare and exceptional
cases. Third, the prospective parents must have received genetic
counseling. The details of the procedure-including risks and
likelihood of success-must be explained to them, they must give
their informed consent to the selection procedure, and each
individually must agree to the IVF procedure.7 ' Fourth, the parents
must have been informed that if the embryos produced are not of
the desired sex, no additional approval will be given for another
IVF procedure until all of the functional embryos from the
previous round have been used for reproductive purposes. 76
69 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5.
70 MINISTRY OF HEALTH, DIRECTOR GENERAL CIRCULAR: NOHAL BHIRAT MIN
HAYILOD BETAHALICHEY I.V.F, HOZER MANKAL MISRAD HABRIUT MISPAR 17/03
[PROCEDURE FOR SEX SELECTION IN IVF PROCEDURES], Sep. 14, 2003, available
at http://www.abush.health.gov.il/download/forms/a1265_mkI7_03.pdf.
n 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5, § 2.1.
72 id
7 3 Id. § 2.2.1.
74 Id. § 2.2.2.
7 Id. § 2.2.3.76 1d. § 2.2.4.
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In order to implement the regulatory scheme, a professional
committee was established," comprised of a psychologist, a bio-
ethicist, a social worker, a lawyer, a physician with expertise in
genetics, an obstetrician-gynecologist, and a religious official."
The professional committee is authorized to deliberate and rule on
an application for sex selection, based on the conditions
enumerated in the Circular.79 While the Circular does not address
the matter, under Israeli law such a decision may be reviewable in
court, but the grounds for review are usually limited to violations
of due process and gross unreasonableness.o
In addition to determining whether the preconditions have been
met, the committee must also consider, before granting a permit,
several additional factors. First, it must inquire whether the parents
are employing IVF for medical reasons, independent of the sex
selection."' If parents seek to use IVF only for non-medical
reasons, the committee is required to examine the risk to the
woman posed by the procedure," taking into account her general
n Id. § 3.
78 It is noteworthy that this is not the first time in Israel where a matter of
public controversy has been regulated by the establishment of a public-
professional committee authorized to grant individual permits. Under the
Surrogate Motherhood Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of
Newborn) Law, 5756-1996, 1996, S.H. 1577, 176, for example, every surrogacy
agreement must be approved in advance by a public-professional committee.
More recently, the law regulating the rights of the terminally ill, enacted in
2005, authorized two similar types of committees to determine the medical
treatment of terminally ill patients. Terminally Ill Law, 5776-2005, S.H. 2039.
The composition of the various committees is similar: they include a varying
number of people from the fields of medicine, psychology, ethics, law, and
religion. The use of these public-professional committees appears to be a
common method in Israel for reaching decisions on matters of public
controversy that raise weighty ethical and religious questions.
7 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5, §§ 2-3.
80 Basic Law: The Judiciary, 1984, S.H. 158, § 15(c)-(d), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm; HCJ 3511/02 Negev
Coexistence Forum v. Ministry of Infrastructure [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 102,
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/searcheng/verdict by-case
rslt.aspx?casenbr-3511&case_year-02; BARUCH BRACHA, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 13 (vol. 1, 1997).
81 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5, § 2.3.1.
82Id. § 2.3.2.
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state of health. Second, the committee must inquire whether the
embryos would have been subject to preimplantation diagnosis for
medical reasons." Presumably, if the embryos already needed to
be subjected to PGD for medical reasons, the decision to approve
sex selection would be made easier. Finally, the committee must
examine the familial and social situation of the applicants,
including their ages.84 Applications may be filed by married and
unmarried couples (as long as neither partner is married to
someone else)." In principle, the possibility is available to single
mothers as well."
Even if all the preconditions are met, the committee must be
persuaded, after taking account of the pertinent professional and
ethical considerations, "that there exists compelling justification
for selecting the sex of the child to be born in the case at issue.""
Only then may it grant the requested permit.
V. ISRAELI LAW AND PRACTICE: DISCUSSION
The 2005 Circular paves the way for selecting a newborn's sex
for non-medical reasons, but the underlying policy it evidences is
far from unequivocal. On the one hand, its scope is limited a
priori: it addresses sex selection by means of PGD only, and it
therefore does not even consider the legitimacy of sperm sorting.
On the other hand, the Circular's regulatory regime is certainly not
rigid, nor even entirely clear. Despite its cautious point of
departure, which attempts to substantially restrict attempts to
choose an embryo's sex for non-medical purposes, it leaves the
committee a degree of leeway and discretion to grant permits even
for cases that do not strictly meet the stated preconditions.
The regulatory scheme is grounded in the recognition of the
couple's powerful desire to produce a child of a particular sex, and
of the threat to the mental health of all concerned if they fail to do
83 Id. § 2.3.3.
84 Id. § 2.3.4.
85 Id. § 3.2.
86 Id. § 3.2.3. As a practical matter, however, it seems unlikely that a single
mother who has four previous children would want to bear and raise a fifth on
her own.87 1d. § 2.2.5.
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so. This proviso is nondirigible, despite its essentially subjective
nature and the correspondingly broad discretion it confers on the
professional committee." The Circular further allows for
authorization only where the couple already has four children of
the same sex. This condition may be waived under exceptional
circumstances.
Although the Circular revokes the outright ban on sex
selection, its extremely cautious guidelines ensure that it is
permitted only in exceptional cases, limited to situations of
extreme sex imbalance within a family, and other unique cases.
The risk to the woman's health is minimized by the requirement
that the committee factor in considerations pertaining to her
medical condition. Still, the criteria leave the committee a broad
discretionary margin. Even the one objective condition-"that
there already be four children of the same sex, with none of the
other sex"-is not absolute, and deviations from it are allowed
under "exceptional and very rare circumstances."89 While the
committee must specify in writing what these circumstances are,
there is no legislative guidance as to their nature. Accordingly, the
Circular does not establish a strict regulatory framework; rather, it
leaves the decision, in essence, to the professional committee's
discretion. The committee therefore has the power to design
policy for both the short and long term.
Before briefly addressing the committee's actual approach to
date, another important aspect of the regime established by the
Circular deserves attention. The primary criterion for allowing sex
selection is not maintaining gender balance, but avoiding an acute
risk. According to its rule, a permit may be granted only in cases
where "there is a significant and manifest danger of serious, major
harm to the mental welfare of both or one of the parents, or of the
welfare of the child to be born, unless the requested procedure is
performed."9 0 This condition reflects-or, perhaps, gives rise to-
88 The professional committee relies on a psychological evaluation conducted
by a research center chosen via a public tender. Any and all applicants are
required to undergo an evaluation by an agent of the center. Interview with
Tova Bareket, supra note 33.
89 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5, § 2.2.2.
90 Id. § 2.2.1.
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the notion that the birth of a particular child may herald major
emotional damage. But is it conceivable that the birth of a child,
whose only flaw is being of the "wrong" sex, could really cause
such severe harm? The mere specification of such grounds
requires the prospective parents to prove the harm and the
probability of its eventuation within the context of their request for
a permit.
This requirement is highly problematic. First, it is demeaning
to all children whose birth is considered to be potentially so
damaging. Second, it is offensive to the applicants' existing and
future children, for the application must be supported by the expert
opinion of a psychologist who has found that the parent(s) will be
severely harmed by the birth of a fifth child of the same sex. The
unavoidable implication is that the parents are already substantially
distressed by having four children of the same sex. At the very
least, the parents must have been thoroughly disappointed when
they discovered the sex of their last born; otherwise, their claim
that another child of the same sex would cause them "serious
harm" seems unlikely.
But let us assume, contrary to common sense, that this is not
the case, and the family was happy with the four children of the
same sex. For argument's sake, let us also assume that an
application was filed but found unpersuasive and denied by the
professional committee. Assume further that a fifth child is born
and has the "misfortune" of being of the same sex as his or her
older siblings. This child might well conclude ex post facto that
his or her birth was seen by the parents as a cause of severe harm.
Viewed from the parents' perspective, it is not far fetched to
imagine that their frustration resulting from begetting a child of the
same sex yet again would be amplified by knowing that the
authorities were prepared in principle to grant permission-as
evidenced by the promulgation of the Circular-but were
unpersuaded of the need to grant it in the case at hand.
The Circular also assumes that the welfare of the unborn child
may seriously be affected if sex selection is not performed. It is
not clear how such an assessment is made, for it is difficult to
discuss the welfare of an entity that has not yet come into being.
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Beyond that, it is logically difficult (if not impossible) to conclude
that an entity would be better off not being born at all than being
born as a member of one sex rather than the other.91 But to the
extent such projections are possible, the Circular tacitly
acknowledges the possibility of a child suffering serious harm by
being born of the "wrong" sex. In addition to the derogatory
message conveyed regarding gender attribution, this might have
some ill effects as a practical matter. Assuming, again, that some
applications will be rejected, and assuming that a child of the
"wrong" sex is then born, would that child not be injured simply
by learning that the parents had foreseen that his or her birth would
be a source of serious mental harm to them and to him/her alike?
Before concluding, let me briefly recount the performance of
the professional committee to date. In October 2006, the
committee reported to the pertinent Knesset committees.9 2 Two
points from this report are worth mentioning: the number of
granted applications and the perception of the professional
committee members regarding the scope of their discretion under
the Circular. As for the first issue, the professional committee put
the number of applications filed over the year and a half since it
91 Even if it were demonstrated that by being born a certain sex, the child
would be harmed emotionally, this harm is a far cry from the harm needed to
support a morally defensible claim to non-existence. Moreover, the harm
discussed here is speculative, and it is therefore difficult to argue on behalf of a
particular child before she is born that she would have been better off not being
born at all. Lastly, as a matter of logic, the "welfare of the child" is relevant
only when there is a child; but here the thrust of the claim is that there should
not be a child at all. This ethical conundrum is called "the non-identity
problem." DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351 (1984); see also John A.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted
Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 13-14 (2004).
92 The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament. The deliberations took place in a
joint meeting of the Science and Technology Committee and the Labor,
Welfare, and Health Committee. Protocol me-yeshiva meshutefet shel va'adat
ha'avoda, harevacha ve-habriut, mispar 85 ve-va'adat hamada ve-
hatechnologia, mispar 29 [Protocol from 1 Meeting of the Labor, Welfare, and
Health Comm., No. 85, with the Science and Technology Comm., No. 29], Oct.
30, 2006, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/rtf/avoda/2006-
10-30.rtf.
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first convened at 124." Of these, three were granted, thirty-nine
were rejected, and the rest remained pending. This would appear
to be a rather low number of applications.94 As for the issue of
discretion, some members of the professional committee"
complained that the discretion granted them was not broad enough,
and they expressed support for the adoption of a more flexible
arrangement that would make it easier for them to grant
applications for sex selection.
The Circular has not been in force long enough to allow
unequivocal conclusions regarding its policy, but I believe the
concerns raised before the Knesset committee about the limitations
on the professional committee's discretion and the small number of
permits it has granted are not an accurate reflection of reality.
Updated data, not formally published, shows that of 197
applications filed since the Circulation came into force in 2005,
thirteen were granted, seventy-five were rejected, and the rest
remain pending either because not all documents were filed or
because the committee is still considering the case." As of today,
then, the approval rate is above 17%-by no means a negligible
figure.
It is noteworthy that in at least two of the thirteen cases in
which the committee granted permits, the applicant couple did not
already have four children of the same sex; in fact, they had no
93 id.
94 The number of births in Israel was approximately 148,000 during 2006, and
the overall number of births during the relevant period of time-eighteen
months since the Circular was adopted and the date of the report-stood at
210,000. See Press Notice, Central Bureau for Family and Domestic
Establishment Statistics, Dfusey Piryon Be-Israel 2006 [Patterns of Fertility in
Israel] (2006), available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_
template.html?hodaa=200701215. It appears that the number of applications for
sex selections is low not only relative to the number of births, but also given that
the adoption of the Circular opened the gates by providing, for the first time in
Israel, parents the opportunity to apply for the procedure, and thus one could
expect that the numbers of applications would be higher than in an ordinary
year, because it would reflect "suppressed demand."
9 Two out of three members of the professional committee that came to the
deliberation at the Knesset reflected this stand.
96 Interview with Tova Bareket, supra note 33.
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previous children at all. The permits were justified in these cases
on the basis of unique cultural considerations. Under Jewish law,
some religious rituals are performed only by a kohen (literally, a
"priest"-a male descendant of the ancient hereditary Temple
priesthood associated with a particular clan within the biblical tribe
of Levi).97 A kohen by definition is the male biological offspring
of a kohen. Thus a child conceived via anonymous sperm
donation" will not be considered a kohen for the purposes of
performing these rituals. Two couples in which the husband was a
kohen sought to use PGD to ensure that the child conceived
through sperm donation (and therefore not the father's biological
offspring) would be a female. Giving birth to a girl avoids any
issue of kohen status, thereby allowing the parents to conceal their
having resorted to sperm donation and to decide only later whether
to disclose that fact to the child. This example shows the breadth
of the professional committee's discretion and its ability to grant
permits in unusual cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Israeli regulatory treatment of these matters is exceptional
when compared to that in other jurisdictions around the world. In
the United States, for example, there is no legal restriction on
utilizing these procedures. The matter is therefore left to the
profession" and the market, until litigation arises. In European
9 Although the Temple rituals have not been practiced since the Temple was
destroyed in the first century of the Common Era, a kohen retains certain roles in
Jewish ritual. He is the first of those called to read from the Torah; he recites
the "priestly blessing" for the congregation; and he officiates at the ceremony of
the redemption of a first-born male. A kohen is also subject to certain
restrictions, including avoidance of contact with a corpse. See generally High
Priest, or Kohen Gadol (Judaism), ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/topic-265328/high-priest (last visited Apr. 6,
2008).
9' Non-anonymous donations raise a host of religious difficulties, and are not
performed by medical institutions in Israel. See Ruth Landau, The Management
of Genetic Origins in Donor-Assisted Conception in Israel and Elsewhere, 13
HUM. REPROD. 3268, 3270-71 (1998).
99 See Remaley, supra note 2.
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countries, including England,'o Italy,'"' and Germany,'0 2 sex
selection is proscribed, at least to the extent that it is based on non-
medical reasons.
By contrast, Israel chose to permit the procedure on a qualified
basis, declaring its commitment to procreation and the right to
become a parent.' 3 But the basic authorization is circumscribed by
a number of conditions that must be satisfied before the
professional committee can grant a permit for socially based sex
selection. The governing Circular is cautiously worded, indicating
that a permit will be granted only rarely, in extraordinary cases.
Ultimately, however, the committee's members have discretion,
which enables them in principle to grant a permit even when the
preconditions (including the existence of a specified number of
previous children of the same sex) are not satisfied.
Given the decisional framework I suggested earlier in this
Article, which calls for an absolute ban on socially motivated
preimplantation sex selection, the Israeli regulatory scheme is
flawed, not only in its authorizing such selection as a matter of
principle, but also in the conditions it sets for granting such
authorization in practice. As explained earlier, the most persuasive
rationale for banning the practice is based on the interests and
welfare of the children it affects, on the importance of parent-child
relationships, and on the risk of impairing those relationships over
the long run. Against that background, I find the Circular's
precondition to granting a permit for sex selection-the probable
risk of "substantive injury to the parent's emotional health" if a
child of the undesired sex is born-troublesome. The condition is
harmful to children in general and, in particular, to the applicants'
children. It embodies the premise that children are meant to fulfill
their parents' desires, and that a child who fails to meet the
parents' desiderata somehow injures the parents.
1oo Vacco, supra note 62, at 1201-04.
"01 See Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra note 4, at 192.
102 Meister, supra note 4; Robertson, Reproductive Technology, supra note 4,
at 192; Fahrenkrog, supra note 4, at 763.
103 See 2005 CIRCULAR, supra note 5.
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My objection to sex selection by means of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis, based on my concern about impairing family
relations, has implications that go beyond the specific issue
considered in this Article and also apply to other Western
jurisdictions that have yet to ban the procedure. It can be argued
that the broad array of genetic manipulations that will become
possible in the future have implicit within them the potential to
impair parent-child relationships." As explained, the anticipated
impairment results from a change in consciousness produced by
the practice taking root or becoming something bruited about in
public discourse. Even though these fears are not grounded in
direct proof or empirical research, I believe the potential harm
implicit in sex selection by means of PGD and its profound
consequences for the involved individuals and the community as a
whole are so fundamental that they must be taken into account at
the outset, when policy on the matter is set. Freedom of choice
regarding the sex or other genetic characteristics of an embryo
cannot be introduced gradually or on a trial basis. The results of
any such "trial" would not become evident quickly, and once they
became evident-following a substantial change in the concept of
family relations-it would be too late to force the genie back into
the bottle. Therefore, in view of the foregoing risks, this Article
argues that Israel has taken a wrong turn. It is possible, of course,
that experience in other jurisdictions, which may adopt a more
permissive view of these practices than Israel, will show that I
have overstated those risks and that they are, in fact, acceptable.
Should that be the case, the option to reconsider the matter would
remain open.
104 am not speaking here of manipulations whose purpose is to avoid serious
illness, as it could be argued that the very nature of the parent-child relationship
obligates such procedures.
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